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Abstract 
This study reflects on the role, compromise and problems of the external auditor in the corporate governance with 
particular reference to the UK. The external auditor is an independent person or firm of auditors appointed by the 
shareholders to investigate the financial statements prepared by the management and report his findings to the 
shareholders. This study identifies the various instruments used by government and accountancy bodies to regulate 
the role of the auditor. The statutory role of the external auditors is to issue audit report of his opinion on true and 
fair view of the financial statements. The study indicates that the role of the external auditor is greatly facilitated by 
efficient and effective internal control system and with the cooperation of the audit committee. However, the study 
provides striking evidence that in the course of the audit role, some auditors compromise their professional integrity 
for economic gain. The big four firms provide a better picture of the professional compromise. Alongside this, it 
identifies corporate accounting scandal linked to the professional misconduct of the auditors. Furthermore, the 
problems frustrating the effective role of the auditor within the framework of the corporate governance were 
identified in the study as auditor’s independence, morality, public expectation and audit market cartel. In conclusion, 
the study shows that the role of the external auditor is inevitable for good corporate governance. However, to have 
effective role of the auditor, it is recommended among others that the regulatory body should be directly involved in 
the appointment of auditors of large companies.  
Keywords: Corporate governance, External auditor, Accounting scandal, Big four audit firms 
 
1. Introduction 
Within the framework of the corporate governance, management is responsible to prepare the annual financial 
statement detailing the operating results as well as the financial position of a company. The financial statements are 
presented to shareholders to account for the stewardship of the management. However, such financial statements 
may lack credibility and shareholders may hardly believe the information contain therein. In order to overcome the 
problem of credibility of financial statements, an auditor who is independent of the management is appointed to 
investigate the information in the financial statements and report his findings to the shareholders (Al-Thuneibal et 
al., 2011; Millichamp, 2010). 
 
In performing this role, the auditor fosters the trust of the public and encourages them to believe that the financial 
statements are true and fair (Sikka, 2009). However, following numerous cases of corporate scandal, some, which 
were linked to the negligence or involvement of the auditors, the public confidence in the financial statements has 
been eroded (Pflugrath et al., 2007; Percy, 1997; Sikka, 2008a & 2009) and the role of auditors in eliminating agency 
conflict is being doubted. This paper examines the role of the external auditor in corporate governance and to achieve 
this objective the remaining parts of this paper are   divided as   follows:  the second  and third  part discuss the place   
of audit in corporate governance and regulation of external auditing respectively. Part four examines the statutory 
role of the external auditors while fifth and sixth part focus on how auditor’s role is supported by internal control 
system and audit committee respectively. Part seven is on the role of the big audit firms while high profile corporate 
accounting scandal is discussed in part eight. The problems of external auditors are addressed in part nine and this is 
followed by the conclusion and recommendations.   
 
2. Corporate Governance and the Auditors 
 
 
*This is modified version of the paper submitted to University of Northampton for academic exercise. The author thanks Mr   Mike Eade of the 
Northampton Business School, University of Northampton for his comments on the initial draft of the paper.   
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Corporate governance is a system by which firms are directed and controlled (Cadbury, 1992). Larcker et al. (2007) 
describe it as set of mechanisms that influence management’s decisions when corporate ownership is separated from 
control. Corporate governance mechanisms are economic and legal institutions, which provide assurance to the 
investors about the safety of their investment and of getting back returns on the investment (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1999).   
 
One of the mechanisms for providing assurance to the investors and other stakeholders is corporate auditing. The 
principal characteristics of ensuring effective corporate governance such as transparency, accountability and integrity 
are enhanced with conduct of audit into the affairs of a corporation. 
 
Generally, internal and external auditors may conduct audit into the operation of a company. The internal auditors 
are the employees of a company who are appointed by the management to carry out audit of the day-to-day affair of 
the company as part of the internal control system. 
 
The external auditor is highly regarded in the corporate governance framework because unlike the internal auditor, is 
appointed by the shareholders. The external auditor is an independent person or firm of auditors appointed according 
to statutory requirement to investigate the financial statements of an entity and express his opinion in form of report 
on the true and fair view of such financial statements. OCED (2007) describes external auditors as “auditors of an 
organisation which are not under the control of the organisation and may not report to objectives set by the 
organisation” (p 283).  
 
3. Regulation of the Role of the External Auditor 
External audit of corporate operations and financial statements in most countries has statutory backing. Corporate 
audit by external auditor is made compulsory by laws to address agency problem arising from the separation of 
ownership from corporate management (Coyle, 2010; Solomon, 2010). At the same, the audit is regulated to ensure 
quality of work and minimise abuse in the audit process (ICAEW, 2009). 
 
External audit is regulated in most countries through the mechanisms of self-regulation and external regulation. In 
UK, corporate audit and accountancy profession is regulated through government legislations, special agencies of the 
government and accountancy professional bodies (ICAEW, 2009). 
 
Although there are a number of legislations that regulate corporate audit in UK such as the Companies (Audit, 
Inspection and Community Enterprises) Act 2004, Statutory Auditors and the Third Country Auditor Regulation 
2007, the principal legislation is the Companies Act 2006. Sections 475 to 539 in part 16 of the Act contain 
provisions relating to audit. 
 
Apart from the provisions on appointment (section 498-491), duties and rights (section 498-502) of the auditor etc., 
the Companies Act 2006 brought some changes into corporate auditing in UK over the Companies Act 1985. One 
important change having impact on auditor’s report is section 504 which requires that the name of the senior 
statutory auditor must be stated in the report and personally signed by him which was not the case under Companies 
Act 1985. This suggests that greater responsibility is now demanded of the senior partner in audit work. However, 
the Act has not adequately addressed the age-long problem of auditors’ independent such as provision of non-audit 
service by the auditors to the client.  
 
In addition to legislations, UK government carries out oversight function on corporate audit and implement various 
legislations relating to the accountancy profession through its agencies. Financial Reporting Council (FRC) is one 
important agent of UK government in this regard.  FRC discharges its responsibilities through six organs.1  Out of 
these organs, Professional Oversight Board (POB) plays important oversight regulations on accountancy and audit 
(ICAEW, 2009). The roles of POB include: 
i. To exercise external and independent oversight power on the professional accountancy bodies and the way 
they regulate the professional conduct of their members. 
ii. To function as the statutory oversight of the supervision of the auditing profession and in this case, it is 
responsible for the recognition, supervision and de-recognition of the accountancy bodies that are 
responsible for supervising auditor’s work. 
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iii. To monitor the quality of auditing functions relating to listed public companies through its Audit Inspection 
Unit (ICAEW, 2009). 
 
Apart from POB, the Auditing Practices Board (APB) is also regarded to have great impact on the auditor’s role. It is 
the responsibility of APB to develop standards for auditing, assurance and ethical value of auditor as well as ensuring 
the effective application of the standards (ICAEW, 2009). 
 
The self-regulation of audit is the responsibility of the professional accountancy bodies in UK. The major 
accountancy bodies exercising self-regulation on audit in UK include: 
i. The Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA) 
ii. The Institute of  Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) 
iii. The Institute of  Chartered Accountants in Ireland (ICAI) 
iv. The Institute of  Chartered Accountants of Scotland (ICAS)2 
The roles of these bodies are typically to set standards for entry and education requirement of their members and for 
engagement in public practice and professional conducts. They also deal with matters relating to professional 
misconduct of members. Similarly, International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) and International Accounting 
Standard Board (IASB) play influential role in auditing in UK. IFAC‘s International Standards  on Auditing (ISAs) 
as well as IASB’s International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs)/International Accounting Standards (IASs)  
guide the preparation of financial statements and auditing of companies  in UK. 
 
However, there has been outcry that external auditing is suffering from excessive regulation (Bernnan and McGrath, 
2007). It is claimed that regulation of auditing profession has been “wrested from the hands” of the accounting 
bodies and taken over by the UK government (Marcus, 2006). Marcus (2006) argued that the situation which the 
profession is presently suggests that “new problem,” “new scandal” and “new regulation”. Added to this, the cost of 
complying with numerous regulations is becoming great. Critics have pointed out that implicit and explicit costs of 
the excessive regulations may be greater than the benefits accruing to the society (Bernnan and McGrath, 2007). 
 
Nevertheless, the important question is: has heavy regulation of audit reduced corporate accounting scandal?  
Evidence shows that after the passage of Sarbanes Oxley (SOX) Act 2002 in US, there were several cases of 
corporate accounting scandal that followed, for instance, the scandal of AIG in 2004, Lehman Brothers in 2010. The 
recurring cases of accounting scandal in recent time are indication that regulation alone cannot solve the problem 
confronting corporate audit. Perhaps consideration should be given to morality.    
 
4. The Role of the External Auditors  
For the shareholders and other stakeholders to believe in the financial statements, it is imperative to appoint 
independent expert to audit the financial statements (Coyle, 2010), hence the role of external auditors in corporate 
governance. The role of the external auditors in sustaining good corporate governance is widely acknowledged. 
Cadbury (1992) declared that “the annual audit is one of the cornerstone of corporate governance...The audit 
provides an external and objective check on the way in which the financial statements have been prepared and 
presented...”(p.36).  Through the role of external auditor, the shareholders monitor and control the management and 
this helps to enhance transparency in a company (Solomon, 2011). 
 
Basically, the statutory role of the external auditors is to issue audit report of his opinion on financial statements. In 
UK, the functions and duties relating to this role are specified in details under sections 495-498 of the Companies 
Act 2006. Section 495 provides that  external auditor must prepare report on all annual accounts during his tenure as 
the auditor and present to the shareholders. Such report is to:  
i. identify the annual accounts audited and the financial report framework  used in the preparation of the financial 
statements. 
ii. describe the scope of the audit, auditing standards used in conducting the audit3  
 
Furthermore, the auditor must state in his report whether in his opinion the audited annual accounts give a true and 
fair views pertaining the following: 
i. the statement of financial position (balance sheet) which provides information about the state of affairs of the 
company as at end of the accounting year. 
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ii. the statement of profit or loss and other comprehensive income (the income statement) which provides 
information about the operating performance of the company for the accounting year. 
iii. For a group account, the information in consolidated statement of financial position (consolidated balance sheet) 
and consolidated statement of profit or loss and other comprehensive income (consolidated income statement) 
relating to state of affairs as at the end of the accounting period and the performance for the accounting period. 
Similarly, the auditor must state whether in his opinion the accounts have been properly prepared as prescribed in the 
relevant financial reporting framework and in line with requirements of Companies Act 2006 and ISA.4.  In addition, 
the auditor must state the type of opinion he gives in the report of a company that is whether it is qualified or 
unqualified opinion or emphasis on matter which he wishes to draw attention of the shareholders5. 
 
In respect of directors’ report, the auditor must review the report and state in his report whether the information in 
the directors’ report is consistent with his audit opinion. For the listed companies, auditor must report on the 
auditable part of the directors’ remuneration report and state if it has been properly prepared as prescribed by the 
Companies Act 20066. 
 
In preparing the audit report, section 498 provides for the following duties to be carried out by the auditor: 
i. He must investigate the company to enable he forms opinion whether: 
a) adequate accounting records have been maintained by the company and adequate returns for the purpose of his 
audit have been received from the branches of the company not visited by him. 
b) individual accounts of the company are consistent with the accounting records and returns. 
c)  the auditable parts of the directors’ remuneration report are consistent with the accounting records and returns in 
the case of the companies listed on the stock market,      
ii. The auditor must state in the report where in his opinion: 
a) adequate accounting records have not been maintained by the company and adequate returns for the purpose of his 
audit have not been received from the branches of the company not visited by him. 
b) individual accounts of the company are not in agreement  with accounting records and returns. 
c)  In case of the listed companies, the auditable parts of the directors’ remuneration report are not in agreement with 
the accounting records and returns7. 
iii. The auditor must state in his report where he fails to obtain all the information and explanations, which he 
considers are necessary for successful conduct of his audit. 
iv. The auditor must include in his report whether the provisions of section 412 of the Companies Act 2006 relating 
to directors’ benefits disclosure are not complied with in the company’s annual accounts. For the listed companies, 
he must state where the provisions of section 421 concerning the information on the auditable parts of the directors’ 
remuneration report are not complied with in the report.8   
 
The UK company law illustrates that enormous power are given to the auditors to detect and report any financial and 
operational misconduct of the management. To exercise such power in the best interest of the stakeholders, the 
auditors must be independent of the management and must carry out their statutory role without bias or favour. 
However, the greatest impediment to effective discharge of the role is bias, which is rooted from lack of professional 
independence of auditor. In many instances, evidence has suggested that auditors have compromised their 
professional independence for economic gain. In the case of Enron, the firm of Arthur Andersen was allegedly 
reported to have relied on Enron for large portion of its income (Coyle, 2010; Sikka, 2009). 
 
Another issue surrounding the role of the auditors is the gap between public expectation and their assumed role 
particularly in detection of fraud (Cousins et al., 1998; Shaikh and Talha, 2003). Stakeholders expect the auditors to 
detect and report material frauds while the auditors have always claimed that detection of fraud is incidental not 
primary role of auditors. Sikka et al. (1998) declared that this issue has remained controversial and has lower 
credibility and prestige of the auditors’ work. Even then, studies show that some shareholders still have regard for 
audited financial statements because it contains some degree of credible information (Kothra, 2001). 
 
5. Internal Control System and the Auditors’ Role     
The assessment of internal control system is critical to effective discharge of the auditor’s role in corporate 
governance. Such assessment would afford him the opportunity of understanding the client’s control environment, 
which in turn will help him decide on the appropriate audit approach to adopt.  
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In UK, Internal Control Revised Guidance Combined Code (2005) which followed Turnbull Report of 1998 places 
the responsibility for maintaining sound internal control system on the board of directors while the responsibility of 
the management is the implementation of the system. Internal control system facilitates the role of the external 
auditor by ensuring that company maintains quality financial reporting.14  
 
However, if the external auditor observes that the system is weak that suggests that it is less reliable. In this case, the 
auditor may have to do more substantive tests in his work. Auditor is expected to inform management about any 
weakness he observes in the system. Letter of Weakness does this in accordance with requirement of ISA 400.  
 
Weakness in internal control system makes the work of auditor more difficulty. Empirically, Krishanan and 
Visvanathan (2007) show that companies with weak internal control system witnessed more auditor changes. The 
consequence of weak internal control was manifested in the case of Baring Bank in which the general manager 
(Leeson) to Singapore office engaged in an unauthorised speculative trading on the Nikkei, which resulted to loss of 
£827million in 1995 without the knowledge of  the management at head office in London (Coyle, 2010).   
    
6. Audit Committee and the Auditors’ Role 
Audit committee as an important mechanism of corporate governance also supports the external auditor in his role. 
In UK, it was the Cadbury Committee Report (1992) which first recommended that company should have audit 
committee (Solomon, 2010). The UK Corporate Governance Code (2010) provides that audit committee should be 
established with at least 3 members (2 in case of small company), of which 2 must be independent non-executive 
directors. The audit committee is critical to corporate accountability and its responsibility assists the external auditor 
in his role in corporate governance to be transparent. By monitoring the preparation of financial statements by the 
management, audit committee enhances the role of the external auditor .15 
 
The increasing cases of corporate scandal in recent times have encouraged stakeholders to question the adequacy of 
oversight responsibility of the audit committee. In the case of Enron, it was reported that the failure of the audit 
committee contributed substantially to the collapse of the company (Solomon, 2010).   
 
7.Corporate Auditors’ Role and the Big Four 
Many auditing firms operate in different parts of the world. In UK, there are 9,950 firms in 2004 but dropped to 
7,843 in 2009 (Christodoulou, 2010; FRC, 2010a). However, the auditing market in UK and worldwide is dominated 
by four large firms commonly referred to as “the big four”. These firms are PricewaterhouseCooper (PWC), Deloitte, 
Touché and Tohmatsu (DTT), Ernst and Young (EY) and Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler (KPMG). 
 
The big four operates in more than 140 counties and have more than 140,000 employees each with combined global 
income of $103.61billion in 2011 (see Table 1). They have enormous resources with which they can influence 
politicians, regulators and public policy (Sikka, 2009). The firms have admitted to have entered into agreement to 
restrict competitions in auditing market in Italy in 2000 (Sikka, 2009) and this suggests that the big four is cartel. The 
issue in this context is how well these firms have been playing their role as auditors. 
 
However, the big four have been linked to a number of corporate scandal and nefarious acts (Sikka, 2002, 2009). 
Sikka (2009) declared that the big four are willing to indulge in nefarious acts like price-fixing, bribery, corruption, 
money laundering, etc that affect the public in the name of competition.  The behaviour of these firms was 
completely in variance with their code of conduct and professional ethic. Contrarily to its code of conduct, PWC9 
was fined $2.5million in 1999 for braking audit independence rule in respect of ownership of securities in a 
company, which it was the auditors. It was also fined $5 million for violating the same rule in 2000 (Sikka, 2009). 
 
The case of KPMG10 was not different. It was fined $22million in 2005 in a case relating to Xerox for wilfully aiding 
and abetting the company in violation of US law on anti-fraud, reporting and internal control. Similarly, in 2006, US 
government brought a case against it for allegedly false claim of travelling reimbursement and it agreed to pay 
$2.77million (Sikka, 2009). 
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Similarly, EY11 had acted in a number of instances against its code of conduct. EY was fined $1.7million in 2004 for 
breaching SEC’s independence rule by entering business relationship with PeopleSoft, the company that it served as 
auditor. Furthermore, in 2006, it paid fine of $4.5million on allegedly false claim of various travelling 
reimbursements with US government (Sikka, 2008b, 2009). 
 
DTT12 was also reported to have acted in similar manner. It was fined $50million to settle charges resulting from the 
failure of Adelphia Communication during its audit engagement with the company. 
 
The alleged involvement of the big four in nefarious acts is a proof that these firms  are not operating by good 
example and these acts have great impact on the reputation of the accountancy profession. This is so because these 
firms control large part of the global audit market and any negative acts by them will attract great attention and 
publicity worldwide.  
 
8. Corporate Accounting Scandal 
 
The frequency of corporate accounting scandal in the last past decade is alarming and has caused the public to 
question the role of the auditors in corporate governance. The numerous cases of corporate scandal have created 
crisis of confidence in the accountancy profession (Dewing and Russell, 2004). Though not every case of corporate 
scandal and failure can be attributed to auditing failure or auditor’s negligence, some high profile cases as Enron, 
WorldCom, Parmalat, AIG, Xerox, Adelphia, Lehman Brother etc (see Table 2) were substantially linked to audit 
failure (Coyle, 2010, Sikka, 2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2009; Solomon, 2010). 
 
Enron accounting scandal was a popular one. Enron was established in 1985 as US based energy company and it was 
prosperous in its early life that its stock rose by about 311% in 1990s (Coyle, 2010; Healy and Palepu, 2003). 
Though the sign of distress in the company started emerging in 1997 when it wrote off  $537million to settle a 
contract dispute with another company, it became obvious that Enron was in serious problem when in November, 
2001 it restated its account of 1997 – 2000 to correct accounting abnormality. The restatement brought down its 
reported earnings for this period by $591million and increased the debt by $658million (Healy and Palepu, 2003). 
Consequently, the credit rating agents downgraded the company and it filed for bankruptcy in December 2001. 
Arthur Andersen that was the auditor of Enron was accused of negligence in its duty and was criticised of 
compromising its professional position for financial gain and this led to the winding up of the firm.  
       
Similarly, accounting scandal in Parmalat, an Italian company was also attributed to failure in auditor’s role. The 
company was one of the largest diary companies in the world operating in 30 countries (Celani, 2004; Solomon, 
2010). However, following the default in the payment of debt of €150million in November 2003, a big hole was 
discovered in the company’s account. About 38% of the total asset of the company was reported to be held in 
nonexistent account with €3.9million operated by its subsidiary (Bailat) in Bank of America (Analyzr, 2012; 
Solomon, 2010). The auditor first verified about the account in December 2002 and received a reply on a forged 
letter of the Bank of America stationary in March 2003, which confirmed the existence of the account. This was a 
case of fraud. The auditor was Grant Thornton International from 1990 to 1999 and was replaced by DTT. None of 
these firms uncovered the big hole in the account. This is an indication of complete brake down in the internal 
control, which the auditors should have detected, and act accordingly.  
 
WorldCom was another high profile accounting scandal resulting from audit failure. WorldCom was US based 
telecommunication company, which grew rapidly through aggressive acquisition (Meyer, 2007). In 2002, the internal 
auditors of the company uncovered $3.8billion fraud perpetrated by inflating the revenue and treating revenue 
expenses as capital expenses (Tran, 2002). This resulted into $3.3billion not properly accounted for between 1999 
and first quarter of 2002. Arthur Andersen that was the auditor of the company issued a clean health report on the 
company during the period and did not uncover the fraud.  
 
In every scandal, the auditors have always put up a defence that it is clients’ responsibility to detect and prevent 
fraud, error and other irregularities in their organisations (ISA 240, Goodwin and Seow, 2002; Gray and Manson, 
2000; Sikka and Willmott, 1995). The auditors are still holding to the principle, which views audit as watchdog not 
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bloodhounds and not expected to detect fraud as enunciated in the case of Kingston Cotton Mill Company13 in 1896. 
Unfortunately, times have changed and public expectation of the role of the auditors has equally changed.  
 
9. The Problems Frustrating Effective Role of External Auditor 
 
9.1 Auditor Independence 
 
The faith of the stakeholders in the auditor’s report is rooted in the fact that auditor is free from the influence of 
management that is independence of management. Independence of the auditor is central to audit. The report of 
auditor who is not seen to be independent may be regarded as unreliable and lacking credibility. 
 
Auditor’s independence may be threatened by factors such as deriving significant financial interest from a client, 
provision of non-audit services to a client, having close relationship with a client and intimidation (IFAC, 2010). In 
recent times, it was reported that the greatest threat to the auditor’s independence is the provision of non- audit 
services to clients (Coyle, 2010; Goodwin and Seow, 2002; Sikka, 2009; Colbert, 2002; Ojo, 2006). Auditors may 
compromise their independence because they derived substantially part of their income from non-audit services 
(Fearnley et al., 2002). Evidence has shown that the large firms derived great part of their income from non-audit 
services (see Table 3). The problem with provision of non-audit services is that it divides the focus of the auditor and 
creates unnecessary compromise. 
 
Another area of independence, which no much is talk about, is appointment of external auditor, which in theory is 
done by the shareholders from recommendation of the directors. In reality, the management does the appointment 
and auditor may do anything to favour his employer (Solomon, 2010).   
 
9.2 Ethical Value and Morality 
 
The conducts of audit require someone with strong ethical value and it is for this reason that accountancy bodies 
issue ethical code to their members. The ethical code is made up values and principles, which guide auditors in their 
professional conduct (Calota, 2008).  The fundamental principles of the ethical code are integrity, objectivity, 
professional competence and due care, confidentiality and professional behaviour (IFAC, 2010).  The first problem 
with the ethical code issued by profession bodies is implementation. Auditors do not follow the tenet of the code in 
their professional conduct. For instance, in 2002, PWC violated the code regarding audit independence. Similarly, 
EY breached the code in 2004 by entering into unethical relationship with its client in US (Sikka, 2009). 
 
The second problem with the code is that it focuses only on ethical or unethical action of the auditors not whether the 
action is right or wrong (Talha and Shalka, 2003). The code is based on ethical theory of deontology, which is rule 
oriented and concerns about the action, rather than consequence of an action that is why auditor who observed that 
something is wrong in a company would not disclose it because principle of confidentiality forbids him from 
disclosing information of his client to third party (Talha and Shalka, 2003). This suggests that the code hinders the 
principle of utilitarianism (Cooley, 2003), that is doing what is right and acceptable to majority.  
9.3 Public Expectation Gap  
  
 Public expectation gap pertaining auditor’s role is a serious concern to the accountancy profession worldwide 
(Salehi et al., 2009; Sikka et al., 1998; Ojo, 2006). Though the gap has always been there, it became wider following 
the alleged role of some auditors in corporate scandal in recent times.  
 
The main issue in the gap is that the public views the role of auditor to include detection and prevention of fraud 
while auditors maintain that it is incidental role. However, under this controversy, the role theory provides better 
explanation of what responsibility is all about. This theory posits that human behaviour is guided by expectation of 
both the individual and other people (Solomon et al., 1985). This suggests that the auditors’ role should be guided by 
expectation of the public since it is a social position they are occupying for the interest of the public. 
 
Citing the work of Davidson (1975), Adeyemi and Uadiale (2011) argued that unless auditors’ role conforms to 
expectation, audit profession might risk social action of enforcement or penalty for nonconformity. Sikka et al. 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                        www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol 3, No 9, 2012 
 
121 
(1998) contended that the greater the gap between public expectation and auditors’ role, the lower is the credibility, 
respect and reliability accord the auditor’s work.  
 
9.4 Cartel in Audit Market    
 
The big four firms dominate the global audit market. In the US market, these firms between 2002 and 2006 audited 
98% of large companies (Ronen, 2010) and  in UK  market,  the 97% of  companies listed in FTSE were audited by 
them in 2010 (FRC, 2010a). The concentration of the global and UK audit market in the four firms has implication 
for the accountancy profession. First, such concentration may not allow for quality audit because the resources of 
these firms are limited. The study of Francis et al. (2011) indicated that concentration of audit market in the big four 
is detrimental to audit quality.  
 
Furthermore, the concentration will cause disincentive to setting up audit firm and existing firms will be leaving the 
market. This will lead to short of human capital in the market in the long run. In UK, House of Lord’s Economic 
Affairs Committee on “Auditors: Market Concentration and Their Role” noted the problem that small audit firms 
opportunity to grow is limited by the big four (Chamber, 2011). 
 
10.  Conclusion and Recommendations   
  
Theoretically, it is widely acknowledged that the role of the external auditor is inevitable for good corporate 
governance. There is no doubt that the role of the external auditor has brought about improvement in accountability 
and transparency in corporate governance thereby reducing agency problems. The faith of the shareholders and other 
stakeholders in the financial statements has been enhanced by the role of the auditor. 
 
However, the striking findings emanating from this study is that some auditors are compromising their professional 
integrity, objectivity and independence for economic gains. Such behaviour has affected public confidence in the 
credibility of auditor’s report. 
 
Furthermore, the study provides important evidence to indicate that the problems of auditor’s independence, 
morality, public expectation and audit market cartel are frustrating the role of the auditor. In the light of the findings 
of this study, it is recommended that:  
1. In UK, to over the problem of auditor’s independence, FRC should be empowered by law to be involved in the 
appointment of external auditors of large corporations. Furthermore, the Council through APB should issue specific 
guidelines that keep non-audit service substantially low. 
2. The accountancy bodies in UK should review their professional ethical code to emphasize more on action that is 
right that is morality. 
3. Since there is great change in public expectation of auditor’s role, auditor would have to adjust to the expectation 
of the public by paying more attentions on material misstatement in financial statements. Furthermore, auditors 
should not indulge in nefarious acts that may tarnish their image before the public. 
4. The Competition Commission must save the UK audit market from dominance of the large firms through their 
aggressive takeover strategy. The small firms constitute the majority and should have access to the market.      
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Note 
1. The organs of FRC are Accounting Standards Board (ASB), Auditing Practices Board (APB), Financial Reporting 
Reviewing Panel (FRRP), Professional Oversight Board (POB), Accountancy, Actuarial and Discipline Board 
(AADB) and Board for Actuarial Standards (BAS). 
2. Other professional bodies in UK whose members are not auditors are Chartered Institute of Public Finance and 
Accountancy (CIPFA) and Chartered Institute of Management Accountants (CIMA). 
3. Companies Act 2006 section 495(2) 
4. Ibid Section 495(3) 
5. Ibid Section 495(4) 
6. Ibid Section 496 
7. Ibid Section 498(1) 
8. Ibid Section 498(2) 
9. PWC’s code states that the firm will act “ professionally, doing business with integrity, upholding our client’s 
reputation as well as own”(PWC, 2011, p2).  
10. KPMG’s code provides that “acting lawfully and ethically, and encouraging this behaviour...maintaining 
independence and objectivity, and avoiding conflicts of interest” (KPMG, 2010, p24). 
11. The code of EY states that “no client or external relationship is more important than the ethics, integrity and 
reputation” (EY, 2008). 
12.DTT’s code provides that “ we act honesty and integrity, we operate within the letter and the spirit of applicable 
laws” (DTT, 2005, p.2 ). 
13 Kingston Cotton Mill Co Ltd 1896, FN 2,  1Ch 331. 
14. The internal control system supports the role of the external auditors by ensuring company’s operation is carried 
in more efficient and effective manner. It also safeguards the assets of a company from unauthorised usage, loss and 
fraud and ensuring that a company maintained quality internal and external financial reporting through proper 
maintenance of records and generation of credible, relevant and timely information (Coyle, 2010).   
15. The auditor committee assists the external auditor in his role by monitoring the preparation of financial statement 
by the directors and reviewing significant judgments made in the financial statements. It recommends the 
appointment and removal of the external auditor to board and monitors his independence; objectivity and 
effectiveness of the audit process.  
 
Table 1: The Big Four Audit Firms   
Firm Year of 
Statistics 
Revenue Employees  Countries 
Operating 
Head Office 
PricewaterhouseCooper 2011 29.2 169,000 158 UK 
Deloitte, Touché & Tohmatsu  2011 28.8 182,000 150 US 
Ernst and Young 2011 22.9 152,000 140 UK 
KPMG 2012 22.7 145,000 140 Netherland 
Source: Big 4. (2011) The 2011 big four firms performance analysis. 
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Table 2: List of  Corporate Accounting Scandal from 2000 -2011 
Company Auditor Country Alledged Scandal 
2000 
Micro Strategy  
Unify Corporation 
Computer Associate 
Lernout and Hauspie 
Xerox 
PWC 
DTT 
KPMG 
KPMG 
KPMG 
US 
US 
US 
Belgium 
US 
Improper revenue recognition 
 
Prematured revenue recognition 
Improper accounting treatments 
Falsified financial results for  5 years 
2001 
One Tel  
Enron  
EY 
AA 
Australia 
US 
 
Falsified financial results to boost profit & hid debt 
2002 
 
Adelphia Communications 
 
CMS Energy 
 
Tyco 
Reliant Energy 
 
Worldcom 
 
AOL Time Warner 
 
Duke Energy 
 
El Paso Corporation 
 
Global Crossing 
 
Homestore.com 
Mirant 
Peregrine Systems 
 
Nicor Energy 
 
Kmart 
 
Halliburton 
Dynegy 
 
Merck 
Qwest Communications  
 
Bristol-Myers Squibb 
 
Sumbeam 
Imclone Systems 
Freddie Mac 
 
DTT 
 
AA 
 
PWC 
DTT 
 
AA 
 
EY 
 
DTT 
 
DTT 
 
AA 
 
PWC 
KPMG 
KPMG 
 
AA 
 
PWC 
 
AA 
AA 
 
PWC 
AA/ 
KPMG 
PWC 
 
AA 
KPMG 
PWC 
 
US 
 
US 
 
Bermuda 
US 
 
US 
 
US 
 
US 
 
US 
 
Bermuda 
 
US 
US 
US 
 
US 
 
US 
 
US 
US 
 
US 
US 
 
US 
 
US 
US 
US 
 
Overstated profit by inflating capital expenses & 
hiding debt. 
Round-trip trades to artificially boost trading 
volume 
Improper accounting practices 
Round-trip trades to artificially boost trading 
volume 
Overstating cash flow by classifying operating 
expenses as capital expenses. 
Inflated sales by booking barter deals to keep 
revenue growth up. 
Involved in round-trip trades to boost trading 
volumes and revenue.  
Engaged in round-trip trades to boost trading 
volumes and revenue.  
Engaged in swaps with other carriers to inflate 
revenue and shredded accounting documents. 
Inflated sales by booking barter transactions .   
Overstated balance sheet items. 
Overstated  sales by improperly recognizing 
revenue. 
Improper accounting practice which boosted 
revenue and underestimated expenses. 
Misleading accounting practices intended to 
decessive investors. 
Improper treatment of construction cost overruns. 
Involved round-trip trades to boost trading volume 
and cash flow. 
Recorded of uncollected co-payment. 
Inflated revenue through swaps and improper  
 
Improper revenue recognition and understated 
reserve for sale return etc. 
Inflated revenue by forcing wholesalers to accept 
inventory. 
Understated earnings 
2003 
Parmalat 
Nortel  
Royal Abold 
TG 
DTT 
DTT 
 
Italy 
Canada 
Neitherland 
 
Falsified documents relating to bank account 
Improper distribution of bonus 
Inflated allowances. 
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2004 
AIG 
Brand Chiquita 
PWC 
EY 
 
US 
Improper accounting practice 
Made illegal payment 
2008 
Bernard L. Madoff 
Investment Security LLC 
Anglo Irish Bank  
FH 
 
EY 
US 
 
Ireland 
Operated fraudulent investment scheme which paid 
abnormal high return (Ponzi scheme) 
Covered up loan 
2009 
Satyam Computer Service 
 
PWC India Falsified accounting records 
2010 
Lehman Brothers EY US Manipulated accounting to decesive investors  
2011 
Olympus Corporation EY Japan Deferred  posting of losses on investment securities  
 
Sources: Derived from 
Forbes (2002) The corporate scandal sheet. 
Golden, A.M. (2009) Madoff’s investment scandal. 
Russell, J. (2011) Olympus reveals details of accounting scandal 
Sharp, A (2010) Lehman Bro.’ “Repo 105” account scandal – accounting gimmicks or   outright fraud. 
Sullivan, K. (2006) Corporate accounting scandals. 
Wikipedia (2012) Accounting scandal. 
Young, D.R. (2009) Actuarial accounting: a cautionary report 
 
Table 3:  Big Four Firms’ Audit and Non-Audit Fees from 2009-2011  
Auditor Year Audit Fees Non-Audit Fees Total 
Revenue 
  $’billion Percent $’billion Percent $’billion 
PricewaterhouseCooper 2011 14.14 48.39 15.08 51.61 29.22 
 2010 13.27 49.94 13.30 50.06 26.57 
 2009 13.10 50.00 13.10 50.00 26.20 
Deloitte, Touché & Tohmatsu 2011 12.30 42.71 16.50 57.29 28.80 
 2010 11.70 43.98 14.90 56.02 26.60 
 2009 11.90 45.59 14.20 54.41 26.10 
Ernst and Young 2011 10.56 46.15 12.32 53.85 22.88 
 2010 10.06 47.32 11.20 52.68 21.26 
 2009 10.10 47.09 11.35 52.91 21.45 
KPMG 2011 10.48 46.15 12.23 53.85 22.71 
 2010 9.91 48.04 10.72 51.96 20.63 
 2009 9.90 49.25 10.20 50.75 20.10 
Sources: Derived from 
PricewaterhouseCooper (2011) Annual report. 
Ernst and Young (2011) Annual review. 
Deloitte, Touché and Tohmatsu. (2011) Financial statements.  
KPMG (2011) International Annual Review. 
Big 4. (2011) The 2011 big four firms performance analysis.              
 
